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Recent work in formal semantics suggests that the language system includes
not only a structure building device, as standardly assumed, but also a natural
deductive system which can determine when expressions have trivial truth-
conditions (e.g., are logically true/false) and mark them as unacceptable. This
hypothesis, called the ‘logicality of language’, accounts for many acceptability
patterns, including systematic restrictions on the distribution of quantifiers.
To deal with apparent counter-examples consisting of acceptable tautologies
and contradictions, the logicality of language is often paired with an additional
assumption according to which logical forms are radically underspecified:
i.e., the language system can see functional terms but is ‘blind’ to open class
terms to the extent that different tokens of the same term are treated as if
independent. This conception of logical form has profound implications: it
suggests an extreme version of the modularity of language, and can only be
paired with non-classical—indeed quite exotic—kinds of deductive systems.
The aim of this paper is to show that we can pair the logicality of language
with a different and ultimately more traditional account of logical form. This
framework accounts for the basic acceptability patterns which motivated the
logicality of language, can explain why some tautologies and contradictions
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are acceptable, and makes better predictions in key cases. As a result, we
can pursue versions of the logicality of language in frameworks compatible
with the view that the language system is not radically modular vis-a´-vis its
open class terms and employs a deductive system that is basically classical.
Keywords: logical form, triviality, quantifiers, contradictions, tautologies,
natural logic, modularity. Words: 11,773
1 Introduction
One of the most important recent hypothesis about the computational ar-
chitecture of language is that it consists not only of (i) a structure building
device (e.g., ‘Merge’ + the corresponding semantic operations), but also of (ii)
a ‘natural logic’ or automatic deductive system. We shall call the view that
(i) and (ii) work together to determine the set of acceptable expressions of
natural languages, the ‘logicality of language’ (Fox 2000, Fox & Hackl 2007,
Chierchia 2006, 2013, Abrusa´n 2011a, 2014). The question explored in this
paper is: What notion of logical form should we pair with the logicality of
language? The term ‘logical form’ is used here in its broad descriptive sense.
As a starting point, we can say that the ‘logical form’ of an expression is the
underlying representation which is the input to its semantic interpretation.
At this level, ambiguities are resolved and semantic values can be assigned to
complex expressions as a function of those assigned to their constituents (Heim
& Kratzer 1998, Fox 2003). Accordingly, our main question can be reformulated
as follows: to develop a defensible version of the logicality of language, what
kinds of revisions do we need to make to the standard conception of logical
form? The answer to this question will determine not only the ultimate viability
of the logicality of language hypothesis, but also its implications to various
foundational issues such as the degree of modularity of the language system
and the nature of its interface with our general reasoning capacities.1
1 Terminological note. Most philosophers distinguish between two broad notions of ‘logical
form’ (see e.g., Stanley 2000, Szabo´ 2012, Iacona 2017). In its ‘descriptive’ sense—which is
the primary focus of this paper—the ‘logical form’ of an expression is a level of representation
that is the input to semantic interpretation. In its second, ‘revisionary’ sense, ‘logical
forms’ are formulae in artificial languages which, for scientific or other investigations, we can
assign to expressions of natural languages. Depending on the goals, we can choose different
regimentations. We are not directly concerned with ‘logical forms’ in this second sense. Still,
since a major project of linguistic semantics is to model why native speakers find certain
inferences bad or compelling, the two notions can be intimately connected. Indeed, some
philosophers have searched for a unified conception (for critical discussion see Szabo´ 2012
and Iacona 2017).
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To appreciate the importance of this issue, we begin by briefly describing
why theorists have proposed the logicality of language. Two observation are
crucial. First, some robust acceptability patterns cannot be explained purely
syntactically. Important examples include systematic restrictions on the kinds
of quantifiers that can occur with exceptive phrases, illustrated in (1), and
there-existentials, illustrated in (2). Second, given independently plausible
logical forms and interpretations for the functional terms, the unacceptable
examples in each pair can be shown to be trivial: i.e., in all worlds or situations,
(1-a) is false and (2-a) is true.
(1) a. *Few students but Sue passed the exam.
b. All students but Sue passed the exam.
(2) a. *There is every red apple.
b. There is a red apple.
As we review in §2, this kind of triviality underwrites various general semantic
restrictions on the distribution of quantificational determiners, among other
systematic acceptability patterns (Gajewski 2002, 2009, Fox & Hackl 2007,
Chierchia 2006, 2013, Abrusa´n 2014). It follows that we can explain these
patterns if we accept the logicality of language, i.e., the hypothesis that the
language system works with a deductive system that can automatically compute
whether, and filter-out when, an expression is trivial (true/false in all worlds
or situations).
As it stands, however, the logicality of language raises an obvious worry
(see e.g., Fox & Hackl 2007, Gajewski 2002, 2009, Chierchia 2013). If the
deductive system marks as ungrammatical or unacceptable trivial sentences
such as (1-a)-(2-a), why are apparently simpler examples of triviality, such as
the contradictions and tautologies in (3), perfectly acceptable?
(3) a. It is raining and it is not raining.
b. If John is wrong, then John is wrong.
Indeed, communication with such superficially trivial expressions is not un-
common. Furthermore, we can imagine a language device which, being paired
with an automatic and unforgiving deductive system, would force us to rescue
expressions like those in (3) by overtly modifying at least one of the problematic
predicates, as in it is raining and it is not raining hard and if John is somewhat
wrong, then John is totally wrong. How, then, can we reconcile the presumed
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logicality of language, so as to account for the patterns in (1)-(2), with the
ubiquity of acceptable trivial sentences such as those in (3)?2
In response to this challenge, most proponents of the logicality of language
add to the basic framework the following hypothesis: the deductive system
operates on logical forms which are radically underspecified with respect to the
content of their non-logical terms (Gajewski 2002, Fox & Hackl 2007, Chierchia
2006, 2013). This hypothesis is often attributed to Gajewski (2002, 2008b,
2009), who proposed one of its most simple and elegant formulations:
(4) Logical skeletons
a. The subset of the trivial sentences which are unacceptable is for-
mally definable by the configuration of their functional terms at
logical form. Call these ‘L-trivial’.
b. Language and its deductive system ‘see’ only ‘logical skeletons’:
representations that are underspecified with respect to the content
of their non-logical expressions.
c. Logical skeletons treat all tokens of non-logical expressions as
independent—even tokens of the same expression.
The basic idea is that if we accept Logical skeletons, as defined in (4), we
can explain key patterns of semantic restrictions on quantifiers, such as those
illustrated in (1)-(2), without incorrectly predicting that trivial sentences such
as those in (3) are also marked. For example, we will show later that in a
case like (1-a), the triviality can be traced solely to the configuration of logical
terms—the interpretation and identity of the non-logical terms is irrelevant. In
a case like (3-a), however, the contradiction is due also to the identity of the
non-logical terms. If the deductive system cannot ‘see’ that the two tokens of
rain are the same, it cannot determine that there is a contradiction in (3-a)
and so doesn’t mark that expression as unacceptable. Assuming the details
can be worked out, postulating that the Grammar and its deductive system see
only logical skeletons seems to account for the difference between acceptable
and unacceptable trivial sentences, a considerable feat.3
2 Terminological note. In this paper, I follow the standard convention in linguistics of using
the terms ‘unacceptable’ and ‘*’ to mark expressions that are bad in a strong sense, i.e.,
indistinguishable or quite similar to the phenomenology of ungrammaticality. The flip side
of this is that, in the sense used here, an expression can be strictly ‘acceptable’ and still be
somewhat odd. There are of course many borderline cases, but in most of the cases explored
in this paper the classifications are relatively uncontroversial.
3 I should clarify at the outset that none of the competing views for how to develop the
logicality of language identify logical triviality with ungrammaticality. These views are
compatible with the standard position that some non-trivial sentences are unacceptable for
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Treating logical forms as logical skeletons has far reaching implications
for our conception of language, natural logic, and their interface with general
knowledge and reasoning. First, it entails a division between semantics and
pragmatics according to which what is delivered by the compositional processes
to pragmatics are not even characters, as standardly conceived (cf. Chomsky
2005, 2013). Secondly, logical skeletons are best paired with a view of the
Grammar as radically modular: i.e., as insulated not only from conceptual
systems and general knowledge, but even from information that is standardly
taken to be encoded in the lexicon. Thirdly, a deductive system which can
only see logical skeletons—such that every predicate hence sentential token is
treated as if independent—is one for which most classical formulas and rules
of inference are not valid (cf. Williamson 1994). To be sure, proponents of
the logicality of language such as Chierchia (2013) and Fox & Hackl (2007)
explicitly embrace versions of the first two implications. At the same time, the
full effect of the third implication is less appreciated, and arguably problematic
for some accounts based on the logicality of language, as I argue in §5.2-5.3.
At any rate, it is obviously worth exploring whether we can wed the logicality
of language with different assumptions about logical form.
The main task of this paper is to show that we can maintain the logicality
of language, as outlined in (i) and (ii) above, and account for the difference
between L-trivial and acceptable trivial sentences, without assuming that the
deductive system operates on logical skeletons. We adopt instead a standard
view of logical forms, such that they represent when different tokens are of the
same non-logical terms; but assume, following Sauerland (2014) and related
proposals by Mart´ı (2006), Pagin & Pelletier (2007), Recanati (2010), Stanley
(2000), Szabo´ & Stanley (2000), Kamp & Partee (1995), among others, that at
LF non-logical or open class terms—e.g., nouns and verbs—can be arguments
to operators which modulate their meaning.4
purely grammatical reasons. They are also compatible with the view that some expressions
which ultimately have trivial truth conditions are acceptable. With respect to the latter
point, however, there are some subtle differences between the views (see §3.3 below).
4 For our purposes, the key characteristic of this family of views is that open class terms are
represented in a way that allows for modulation. The implementation I present—using an
optional higher-order covert operator—is most directly inspired by Sauerland (2014). For
reasons that will emerge, I think this implementation has key advantages. Still, I expect that
other implementations could, with some refinements, be adopted. For example, we could
use a constrained version of the system defended in Pagin & Pelletier (2007) and Recanati
(2010), where the interpretation function is defined in terms of a modulation function. We
could also pursue a version of Stanley (2000, 2007), and assume that open class terms are
restricted via intersective combinations with covert syntactic elements. In all these cases,
the hypothesized operations that perform modulation can be heavily constrained—which is
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(5) Logical forms + Rescale
a. The subset of the trivial sentences which are unacceptable is for-
mally definable by the configuration of their functional terms at
logical form. Call these ‘L-trivial’.
b. Language and its deductive system see representations whose con-
stituents, including non-logical terms, have been assigned their
semantic values, and see when different tokens are of the same open
class term.
c. Non-logical items can be arguments of an optional Rescale opera-
tor. Different tokens of the same expression can differ with respect
to whether/how each token is modified by Rescale.
In §4 I show that we can adopt LF+Rescale, as defined in (5), and still account
for the target semantic restrictions on the distribution of quantifiers. That is,
given standard logical forms and an optional Rescale of open class terms, only
L-trivial sentences can be proven to be trivial. In addition, superficially trivial
sentences which are perceived as acceptable, such as those in (3), are correctly
predicted to be acceptable. It follows that accounting for L-triviality is not
a strong reason to accept logical skeletons over LF+Rescale. Furthermore,
I argue in §5 that in some key cases only LF+Rescale makes the right
predictions. If this is correct, we can maintain the logicality of language
without assuming its radical modularity, and in particular that language does
not see information encoded in the lexicon that is unique to particular open
class terms. We can also maintain, or at least explore the hypothesis, that the
natural deductive system of language follows classical inference rules.
2 Restrictions on quantificational determiners
The acceptability patterns which are the main focus of this paper concern
three well-known restrictions on the distribution of quantifiers. The aim of this
section is to see (i) that the key generalizations can best (and arguably only)
be captured semantically, and (ii) that in each case we can systematically show
that the unacceptable cases have trivial truth-conditions. Our presentation
follows closely that of Gajewski (2009).5
required to avoid over-generation of meanings—without affecting any of the points I make
here. These options are compared in more detail in §3.
5 There are other acceptability patterns which have been explained as arising from trivial
truth-conditions, some of which we will discuss in §5.2-§5.3. These include constrains
on adverbial modification (Dowty 1979), polarity items (Chierchia 2006, 2013), modified
numerals (Fox & Hackl 2007), and weak islands (Abrusa´n 2011a, 2014). We focus primarily
on the cases involving quantifiers in there-existentials, connected exceptives and comparatives
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2.1 Definiteness effect in there-existential sentences
The first case we explore involves a definiteness effect in there-existential
sentences, which we already encountered above in (2-a). The basic contrast is
captured by examples such as (6-a)-(6-b) below. As noted in the generalization
in (7), quantifiers such as many and few are acceptable in there-existentials,
whereas quantifiers such as all and most are unacceptable.
(6) a. There are some curious students
b. *There is every curious student.
(7) Generalization:
a. Acceptable: some, three, a, many, few, exactly two, no
b. Unacceptable: every, all, neither, both, the, most
Crucially, the target generalization in (7) can be captured in semantic terms.
Specifically, the determiners that can occur in there-existentials are the weak
determiners (Barwise & Cooper 1981), defined as in (8):
(8) a. Determiner D is positive strong iff for every model M =< J K, De >
and every A ⊆ De, if JDK(A) is defined,
then JDK(A)(A) = 1
b. D is negative strong iff for every model M =< J K, De > and every
A ⊆ De, if JDK(A) is defined,
then JDK(A)(A) = 0
c. D is weak if D is not strong.
A paradigmatic example of a positive strong determiner is every, as illustrated
by the observation that (9-a) is always true, regardless of what interpretation
we assign to JstudentK. A paradigmatic example of a weak determiner is some,
as illustrated in (10-a), which is false in a world where there are no students,
and true in a world in which there is at least one student.
(9) JeveryK(A)(B) = 1 iff A ⊆ B [strong]
a. Every student is a student.
(10) JsomeK(A)(B) = 1 iff A ∩B 6= ∅ [weak]
for two reasons. First, they have played a central role in the argument for logical skeletons;
secondly, the corresponding generalizations and accounts are less controversial than other
generalizations and accounts which appeal to trivial truth-conditions. Of course, whether
the logicality of language should be paired with logical skeletons or LFs+Rescale will
remain an interesting open issue as long as new cases of unacceptability due to triviality (or
counter-examples thereof) continue to be discovered.
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a. Some student is a student.
It is easy to see why the semantic property which captures the acceptability
patterns of quantifiers in there-existentials—namely, that positive/negative
strong quantifiers result in unacceptability—gives rise to trivial truth-conditions:
(i) Assume, as is independently plausible, that Jthere is/areK simply de-
notes De, i.e., the set of entities in the model.
(ii) Given Conservativity,6 if D is (positive) strong, then for all A ⊆ De,JDK(A)(De) = JDK(A)(De ∩ A) = JDK(A)(A) = 1.7
From (i) and (ii) it follows that (6-b), given the logical form in (11-a) (where S
= the set of curious students), is trivially true, whereas (6-a), given the logical
form in (11-b), is true or false depending on whether there are any curious
students.
(11) a. JeveryK(S)(S ∩De) = 1 iff S ⊆ S
b. JsomeK(S)(S ∩De) = 1 iff S ∩ S 6= ∅
If we assume that trivial sentences are filtered out by the deductive system, we
can explain why only weak determiners can occur in there-existential sentences.
2.2 Selection properties of Connected Exceptive Phrases
The second case we consider involves the selection properties of connected
exceptive phrases. The basic pattern is illustrated by the contrast in (12-a)-
(12-b). As specified in (13), the target generalization is quite simple: only
determiners such as every, all, none can host connected exceptives.
(12) a. *Some student but Sue passed the exam.
b. Every student but Sue passed the exam.
(13) Generalization:
a. Acceptable: every, all, none
b. Unacceptable: the rest
Note that the class of determiners that can host connected exceptives is
semantically definable: they are the universal (negative/positive) quantifiers.
6 Conservativity: For all M and all A,B ⊆M , JDK(A)(B) iff JDK(A)(A ∩B).
7 We focus on the case of positive strong quantifiers for simplicity. If D is negative strong
(e.g., neither), then we should change the right hand side of the equation to 0, and instead
of a trivially true we get a trivially false sentence (i.e., false in all words/situations).
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As before, this suggests that the semantic property which captures the target
generalization will play a key role in its explanation.
The basic account, due to von Fintel (1993), is based on two observations:
(i) The complement of but is the least that you have to take out of the
restrictor of the host quantifier to make the statement true.
(ii) Universal determiners—e.g. every and no—are the only determiners
that systematically allow such minimal exceptions. Other quantifiers
yield logical trivialities.
Let us see how this works. Initially, one could be tempted to assign but the
entry in (14-a). The problem, however, is that then (12-b), for example, would
not entail that Sue did not pass the exam. To avoid this problem, von Fintel
argues that we need an entry closer to (14-b):
(14) EveryD [studentA but MaryC ] smokesP
a. JbutK(C)(A) = A− C
b. JbutK(C)(A)(D)(P ) = 1 iff
C 6= ∅ andD(A−C)(P ) = 1 and ∀S[D(A− S)(P ) = 1→ C ⊆ S]︸ ︷︷ ︸
captures ‘the least you have to take out’ constraint
To see the difference between the two entries for but, consider a world w were
every student, including Mary, smokes. According to (14-a), Every student but
Mary smokes would be true in w, which is an incorrect prediction. In contrast,
(14-b) correctly predicts that the statement is false in w. Now, consider the
interaction between but and different kinds of quantifiers. Focusing on examples
such as (12-a), we can show that any left upward entailing quantifier (e.g.,
some, many, three), when hosting a connected exceptive phrase, will result in
a trivially false statement:8
(15) D is a left upward entailing quantifier iff ∀A,B,C s.t.JDK(A)(C) = 1 & A ⊆ B, JDK(B)(C) = 1
Why? If D is left upward entailing and you have removed some individuals
from D’s restrictor and the statement is true, then you could always have
removed fewer and still be left with a true statement. To see this: suppose
8 Note that universal positive/negative quantifiers are left downward entailing. So what we
have to show is why the other left monotonic quantifiers, specifically, the left upward entailing,
cannot host connected exceptives. For simplicity, we ignore for now the left non-monotonic
quantifiers such as exactly 3, which also cannot host connected excepitives, as is illustrated
by *Exactly three students but/except Mary smoked.
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A = B − s, then A ⊆ B. In other words, the set A denoted by ‘B but s’ ⊆ B.
Given a left upward entailing quantifier, you can thus replace A with B (its
superset) in its restrictor. It follows that s is not the least you have to take
out to make statement true, since you can simply take out nothing.
2.3 Negative islands in comparatives
The third and final acceptability pattern concerns negative islands in compar-
atives (Gajewski 2008b). The basic observation, illustrated in (16-a)-(16-b),
concerns constraints on the kinds of quantifiers that can appear inside a
comparative clause.
(16) a. *Mary is taller than no other student is.
b. Mary is taller than every other student is.
(17) Generalization
a. Acceptable: the rest.
b. Unacceptable: no, few, fewer than 4, at most 7, not every
The target generalization can again be captured in semantic terms. The
problematic quantifiers are the downward entailing (generalized) quantifiers.
As before, this suggests that this semantic property is essentially involved in
the explanation of the basic acceptability pattern.
Moving to the explanation, we begin by specifying the truth-conditions
of comparative statements such as (16-a) and (16-b). Following Gajewski
(2008b)’s account, the truth-conditions of the target comparatives are as in
(18).9 We assume, in addition, that gradable adjectives, represented by P in
(18), are monotonic, as defined in (19):
(18) A is P-er than Q is = 1 iff
∃d [A is d-P and Q is not d-P ]
(19) A gradable adjective P is monotonic iff P (d)(x) = 1 and d′ < d, then
P (d′)(x) = 1
Given these assumptions, if Q in (18) is downward entailing, we get tautologies.
9 The precise logical form and truth-conditions of comparatives is an area of lively debate.
For overviews see Schwarzchild & Wilkinson (2002), Schwarzschild (2008), Morzycki (2016).
Gajewski (2008b) argues that a key point in favor of his theory—called the ‘existential’
theory for reasons that will become clear below—is precisely that it can account for the
acceptability pattern captured in (17). Morzycki (2016: ch.4), however, argues that other
standard theories, in particular the ‘maximality theory’, can also capture the target pattern
(via undefinedness of the maximality operator in the unacceptable cases).
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(20) A (generalized) quantifier Q is downward entailing iff for all A,B s.t.
A ⊆ B and JQK(B) = 1, then JQK(A) = 1
To see why, consider two worlds, w1 and w2, and a domain which consists of
the students Mary, Susan, and Bill. In w1, Mary = 1.6m, Susan = 1.5m, Bill
= 1.4m. In w2, Bill = 1.6m, Mary = 1.5m, and Susan = 1.4m. We can easily
see that (21) makes a contingent statement, whereas (22), where Q is replaced
with a downward entailing generalized quantifier, is trivially true.
(21) Mary is taller than every other student is.
a. ∃d [Mary is d-tall and every other student is not d-tall]
= 1 @ w1, for let d = 1.6m, then Mary is d-tall but no one else is
d-tall.
= 0 @ w2 since any d ∈ Mary’s height (0, 1.5] is in Bill’s height
(0, 1.6]
(22) *Mary is taller than no other student is.
a. ∃d [Mary is d-tall and no other student is not d-tall]
= ∃d [Mary is d-tall and every student is d-tall]
= 1 in w1/w2 since d can be between (0, shortest student’s height]
To sum up, if we assume that the deductive system marks as ungrammatical
trivial statements (true/false in all worlds or situations), we can explain the
basic acceptability pattern concerning negative islands in comparatives.
3 The Glitch: Acceptable trivialities, logical skeletons and enriched
logical forms
We have seen that if we assume the logicality of language—i.e., that the
Grammar works with a deductive system which can determine whether, and
filter out when, sentences are trivial—we can account for various systematic
restrictions on the distribution of quantifiers. However, as mentioned in §1,
this otherwise powerful account has a glitch: tautologies and contradictions
are not, in general, marked as unacceptable. Examples such as those in (23),
which superficially seem like the most obvious cases of trivial sentences, are
perfectly grammatical, even if in some contexts they feel somewhat odd:
(23) a. It is raining and it isn’t raining
b. If Fred is wrong, then he is wrong.
c. Every square is a square.
d. My brother is an only child
11
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How can we maintain the logicality of language accounts for the semantic
restrictions on the distribution of quantifiers examined in §2, without incor-
rectly predicting that superficially trivial expression such as those in (23) are
ungrammatical? This section presents and develops two competing solutions
to this problem, Logical skeletons and LF+Rescale.
3.1 Logical skeletons
As noted in §1, Gajewski (2002, 2009) argues that we can solve the glitch
by adopting Logical skeletons (see also Chierchia 2006, 2013, Fox & Hackl
2007). The basic idea, captured in (4) above, is that there is a formally
specifiable subset of the trivial sentences, called ‘L-trivial’, whose members
are unacceptable. Gajewski argues that unacceptable trivial expressions such
as those discussed in §2 are L-trivial, whereas acceptable trivial expressions
such as those in (23) are not L-trivial. This proposal rests on two assumptions
about the architecture of language:
A1. Terms can be sorted into two classes, roughly corresponding to the
traditional dichotomies of logical vs. non-logical terms, functional vs.
non-functional terms, or closed-class vs. open-class words.
A2. The deductive system does not ‘see’ the non-logical terms. Specifically,
their semantic type is represented, so that compositionality can proceed,
but the language system does not encode different tokens of the same
non-logical terms as the same.
The suggestion, then, is that the language system sees only ‘logical skeletons’.
(24) Logical skeleton
To obtain the logical skeleton of a standard logical form α:
a. Identify the maximal constituents of α containing no logical terms.
b. Replace each such constituent with a new constant of the same
semantic type.
We can now formulate precisely which trivial sentences are unacceptable:
(25) (i) A sentence S is L-trivial iff S’s logical skeleton = 1 (or 0) in all
its interpretations (in which S is defined).
(ii) S is ungrammatical if its logical form contains an L-trivial sentence.
In what follows, we assume A1 (for discussion, see van Benthem 1989, 2002,
Gajewski 2002, 2009, Chierchia 2013, Abrusa´n 2014). In most of the cases
12
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we consider, the target terms clearly fall on either the logical/closed-class or
non-logical/open-class side of this dichotomy.10 In addition, we will see in §4
that, as Gajewski has shown, the triviality of our target cases concerning the
distribution of quantifiers can indeed be proven from their logical skeletons.
What is crucial, at this point, is to see why acceptable trivial sentences such
as those in (23) cannot be proven as trivial from their logical skeletons, which
is the desired result. If we apply the procedure in (24) to (23-a), repeated in
(26-a), we get as its logical skeleton (26-b). Note that (26-b) is indistinguishable
from the logical skeleton of a structurally equivalent yet informative contingent
statement such as (27-a). This can be seen by comparing (26-b) and (27-b).
It follows that the deductive system cannot determine (even if we enrich it
with heuristics) that superficial contradictions such as (26-a), which it sees as
(26-b), are trivial. As a result, such expressions are not filtered out.
(26) a. It is raining and it isn’t raining.
b. It is P1,<e,t>-ing and it isn’t P2,<e,t>-ing
(27) a. It is raining and it isn’t snowing.
b. It is P1,<e,t>-ing and it isn’t P2,<e,t>-ing
The same argument can be easily extended to show that the other superficially
trivial examples in (23) are not L-trivial. As mentioned above, we will see in §4
that the target acceptability patterns concerning the distribution of quantifiers
examined in §2 can be predicted from logical skeletons. Taken together, these
results suggest that endorsing Logical skeletons is the key to maintain the
logicality of language, i.e., the hypothesis that the Grammar has an automatic
deductive system which can identify and filter out trivial sentences. Indeed,
most proponents of the logicality of language accept this approach. From now
on, I shall refer to this view using the shorter ‘Skeletons’.
10 This claim should be qualified. As a reviewer pointed out, there is currently no fool-proof
method for distinguishing between functional/logical and content/open-class terms. Indeed,
this is explicitly acknowledged by most proponents of the logicality of language (see, e.g.,
Gajewski 2009, Abrusa´n 2014). One proposal for picking out the logical terms is by appealing
to the property of permutation invariance (e.g., van Benthem 1989). However, as Gajewski
(2009) and Abrusa´n (2014) show, this leaves out some terms whose identity is crucial to
prove some L-trivialities, and arguably allows some terms that are intuitively open-class.
von Fintel (1995) presents a more promising proposal which singles out the functional terms
by appealing to a cluster of properties including permutation invariance, having high-types,
and being subject to universal constraints.
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3.2 Logical forms + Rescale
The main contention of this paper is that there is a better way to maintain
the logicality of language in light of the acceptability of (superficially) trivial
examples such as those in (23). As a starting point, note that there are various
independently motivated views about logical form which entail that (most)
cases in (23) are not trivial (e.g., Sauerland 2014, Alxatib et al. 2013, Recanati
2010, Stanley 2007, Kamp & Partee 1995). These views share the idea that the
meaning of open-class terms can often/always be modulated, either because of
the presence of covert (optional) operators (cf. Sauerland 2014, Mart´ı 2006,
Jacobson 2005, Stanley 2007), or because the interpretation function is defined
in such a way that it modulates the meaning of those expressions as a function
of their fine-grained utterance context (cf. Kamp & Partee 1995, Pagin &
Pelletier 2007, Recanati 2010, Lasersohn 2012).11
The specific proposal I defend—which is most directly inspired by Sauerland
(2014)—was introduced in (5) as LF+Rescale. On this view, we assume that
the Grammar and its deductive system see standard logical forms, in particular
whether different tokens are of the same open class term. To capture the idea
that the interpretation of open class terms can be modulated as a function
of context, we assume that logical forms include an optional polymorphic
type Rescale operator which can take non-logical terms and fine tune (e.g,
intersect) their meaning in certain constrained ways.
(28) Logical Form + Rescale
To obtain an LF+Rescale
a. Identify the minimal projections of open class heads (adjectives,
nouns, adverbs, verbs).
b. You may optionally add Rescale as a sister.
11 Abrusa´n (2014: ch. 6) makes a similar observation in her discussion of logical skeletons
and the logicality of language. Her overall position is broadly congenial to the position
developed here, and most of the objections she raises against logical skeletons complement
the arguments presented in §5. Still, I should mention a key difference between the positive
proposal made by Abrusa´n (2014) and my proposal. To successfully pair views which allow
modulation with the logicality of language, it is, in my view, crucial that the mechanism
which modulates open class terms be implemented as part of the compositional semantics
rather than as a post-compositional, pragmatic processes. The basic argument for this will
be presented in §3.3 and further developed in §5 (cf. Alxatib et al. 2013). Abrusa´n (2014),
however, follows Kamp & Partee (1995) in treating the relevant modulations as pragmatic
processes. In contrast, the account I defend is closer to the syntactic/semantic accounts
defended by Sauerland (2014) and Stanley (2007).
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Overt operators similar to Rescale are terms such as typical and good. Like
those modifiers, Rescale is technically a character, hence its precise effect
depends on the context of utterance. At the most general level, we assume
that, for any open class term P , argument of suitable type x and context c,
{x : Rescalec(P )(x)} ⊆ {x : P (x)}. That is, the meaning modulation is
constrained to specialize meanings, where the precise refinement depends on
the context parameter c. Like its overt counterparts, Rescale can appear at
various positions in an expression, and its context sensitive parameter can be
fixed differently at each position. To model this, we assume that each token of
Rescale is interpreted in its dynamically updated local context.12
LF+Rescale can be refined and developed in various ways. Still, we can
already begin to see how it can account for acceptable trivial sentences. On
this view, acceptable trivial sentences such as (29) and (30) can be assigned
the LFs in (29-a) and (30-a), which are non-trivial and potentially informative
expressions. To be clear, (29) and (30) can also have LFs without Rescale,
as in (29-b) and (30-b); but since these are formally trivial, they are marked as
unacceptable and are dispreferred relative to the alternative disambiguations
which are acceptable and potentially informative.
(29) It is raining and it isn’t raining.
a. It is raining and it isn’t Rescalec(raining).
≈ It is raining and it isn’t raining hard.
b. *It is raining and it isn’t raining.
(30) If Fred is wrong, then he is wrong.
a. If Fred is Rescalec(wrong), then he is Rescalec′(wrong).
≈ If Fred is slightly wrong, then he is totally wrong.
b. *If Fred is wrong, then he is wrong.
The basic idea can be generalized: when Rescale is inserted the resulting
logical forms can ‘rescue’ acceptable tautologies/contradictions such as those
in (23). As a result, LF+Rescale can also explain why superficially trivial
sentences such as those in (23) have acceptable readings.13
12 The notion of a ‘local context’ is here used broadly, and is in principle compatible with
different implementations. Since this paper uses a standard static semantics, it is easier to
opt for implementations designed for static systems, such as Schlenker (2009) and Stalnaker
(2014). But we could also opt for more dynamic implementations, such as Heim (1983,
1982), Barker (2002) and Rothschild (2011).
13 Some clarifications are in order. First, we will see later that we can adopt less constrained
accounts of the expressive power of Rescale without affecting any of the points made in
this paper. Put in terms familiar from discussions of contextualism, although we assume that
the effect of Rescale is intuitively that of ‘enriching’ meanings, everything we say here is
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3.3 Rescale is independently needed: Embedded trivialities
Skeletons and LF+Rescale both have the resources to explain why, even if we
assume the logicality of language, superficial trivial statements such as those
in (23) can be acceptable. However, I now want to suggest that something like
Rescale of open class terms is independently needed to account for certain
simple variations of acceptable trivial sentences.
A crucial difference between Skeletons and LFs+Rescale is that only
the latter has the resources to fully explain the default intuitive readings
of acceptable superficial trivialities. To see why, recall that, according to
Skeletons, an acceptable contradiction such as (31), is seen by the deductive
system as (31-a), which is the reason why it is not ruled out.
(31) It is raining and not raining.
a. It is P1 and not P2.
b. It is P and not P .
At a later post-compositional stage of processing, namely, when (31-a) is sent
to pragmatics for the assignment of full truth-conditions (and further inferential
processes), something like the information represented in (31-b) is recovered,
namely, that P1 = P2. At this point, the contradiction can be identified.
What happens at this stage? As far as I know, neither Gajewski nor others
who endorse Skeletons directly address this question. Still, this account is
compatible with familiar pragmatic stories. Namely, when (31) is recovered
at the (post-compositional) pragmatic stage, we can use Gricean reasoning to
derive, from its assertion, an informative implicature, such as that it is raining
but not that hard.
The problem for this kind of pragmatic account is that there are cases
of embedded uses of acceptable contradictions in non-asserted positions, as
illustrated in (32)-(34). As is well known, such enriched embedded readings
challenge post-compositional pragmatic stories which work on asserted contents
as inputs (Chierchia et al. 2012, Recanati 2003, 2010).
compatible with assuming that it can also ‘loosen’ meanings (cf. Recanati 2010). In this case,
we say that for any open class term P , argument of suitable type x and context c, either
{x : Rescalec(P )(x)} ⊆ {x : P (x)} or {x : P (x)} ⊆ {x : Rescalec(P )(x)}. Secondly,
like typical, Rescale is defined relative to a contextual parameter, and is only felicitous if
the context provides the required information. This predicts that some rescued superficial
contradictions, uttered out of context, can feel somewhat zeugmatic, analogous to an out
of context utterance of that is not like that. Finally, we assume that Rescale can apply
recursively, which is desirable given its status as a modifier similar to typical, and is in any
case required to deal with examples like a typical gun is not a typical gun and it is raining
hard and not raining hard.
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(32) If it is raining and not raining, I am willing to go out and play.
a. If it is raining and not Rescalec(raining), I am willing to go out
and play.
≈ If its raining but not that hard, I am willing to go out and play
(33) If John is tall and not tall, I bet he won’t make it into the basketball
team
a. If John is tall and not Rescalec(tall), I bet he won’t make it into
the basketball team
≈ If John is borderline tall, I bet he won’t make it into the
basketball team
(34) Peter is either smart but not smart, or he has no experience running a
tough business.
a. Peter is either Rescalec(smart) but not Rescalec′(smart), or
he has no experience running a tough business.
≈ John is either book smart but not street smart, or he has no
experience running a tough business.
Although out of the blue cases like (32)-(34) can feel a bit odd, it is clear that
they are strictly acceptable, and it is easy to imagine contexts in which they get
the suggested readings. Furthermore, embedded enrichments in non-asserted
clauses call for a treatment within the compositional semantics. Accordingly,
(32)-(34) point to the availability of a semantic rescue mechanism along the
lines of Rescale: i.e., a way of generating, within the compositional semantics,
formally non-contradictory/non-tautologous logical forms for superficially trivial
sentences in embedded positions, as illustrated in (32-a), (33-a) and (34-a).
As so far presented, LF+Rescale seems to entail that, when using natural
languages, we can’t really assert trivialities: for it works as if the language sys-
tem always generates logical forms which make superficially trivial statements
of the kind in (23) potentially informative. However, there are cases in which
we use such trivial statements to convey precisely the trivial readings. This is
illustrated by a salient reading of the antecedent in (35) below. To see why
LF+Rescale is not in tension with examples like this, recall that Rescale,
just like similar overt modifiers such as typical, is technically a character. Its
full modulatory effect is determined only once certain contextual parameters
are provided.
(35) If John believes that it is raining and not raining, then he has incon-
sistent beliefs.
a. *If John believes that it is raining and not raining, . . .
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b. If John believes that it is raining and not Rescalec(raining), . . .
c. If John believes that it is Rescalec(raining) and not
Rescalec′(raining), . . .
To be clear, this account does predict a default preference for logical forms such
as (35-b)/(35-c) over (35-a). Crucially, however, this technically allows that,
for some c, c′, Rescalec(P ) = P , or that Rescalec(P ) = Rescalec′(P ) (see
the definition of Rescale in §3.2). Hence this account allows for the eventual
assignment of trivial readings to embedded statements such as it is raining and
not raining. Still, since the decision to fix the context sensitive parameter of
Rescale is a post-semantic, pragmatic process, these trivial readings are not
seen as such by the deductive system, hence are not filtered out.14
To sum up, we have seen that although Skeletons and LF+Rescale can
both account for the acceptability of superficially trivial statements such as
those in (23), cases of embedded superficial trivial statements such as (32)-(34)
provide independent motivation for something like Rescale. Obviously, this
is not yet to suggest that we should abandon Skeletons for LF+Rescale. For
what Gajewski (2002, 2009) has crucially shown is that by adopting Skeletons
we can rescue just the acceptable trivial sentences. Only if the same result
can be achieved by adopting LF+Rescale can we say that we have really
undermined, by a kind of Occam’s razor argument, the need to posit logical
skeletons. Establishing that result is the aim of §4. I will then argue, in §5,
that there are various cases in which LF+Rescale makes different and better
predications than Skeletons.
4 Back to restrictions on quantificational determiners: Logical skele-
tons and LF+Rescale
Gajewski (2002, 2009) argues that the triviality patterns involving there-
existentials, connected exceptives and negative islands in comparatives pre-
sented in §2 can be proven from their logical skeletons. Our main task now
is to show that the target trivialities can also be proven from their standard
LFs+Rescale. If correct, this means that, despite common assumptions to
14 One could argue that this account also predicts that there should be a strong default tendency
to interpret superficial tautologies and contradictions non-trivially. Although there are ways
of blocking or hedging this prediction for proponents of LF+Rescale, it is perhaps best for
now to simply accept it. For there is empirical work which suggests that ordinary speakers
tend to interpret superficial tautologies and contradictions informatively (in contrast to,
say, trained philosophers, logicians and formal semanticists). For relevant empirical and
theoretical work, see Osherson & Markman (1975), Wierzbicka (1987), Ward & Hirschberg
(1991), Sauerland (2011), Cobreros et al. (2012), Alxatib et al. (2013), Snider (2015)
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the contrary (see e.g., Chierchia 2006, 2013, Fox & Hackl 2007, Gajewski 2009),
the account of L-triviality used to separate acceptable from unacceptable trivial
sentences does not depend on pairing the logicality of language with Skeletons.
Accounts that use standard logical forms but also allow constrained modulation
of open class terms via something like Rescale work just as well.
4.1 There-existential sentences
Consider first the acceptability patterns involving there-existentials, focusing
again on examples (6-a) and (6-b), repeated here as (36) and (37). It is easy to
see that the original explanation, as spelled out in §2.1, goes through given their
logical skeletons, specified in (36-a) and (37-a). Since some is weak, (36-b)
may get 1 or 0 depending on whether the semantic value assigned to P1—i.e.,
I(P1)—is ultimately empty. On the other hand, since every is strong, (37-b)
will always be true regardless of the interpretation assigned to P1, since for
any assignment, I(P1) ⊆ (I(P1) ∩De) ⊆ De (note: P1 is of type < e, t >). It
follows that only (37) is L-trivial, and predicted to be marked as unacceptable.
(36) There are some curious students.
a. Logical skeleton: [there [are [some P1,<e,t> ]]
b. Interpretation: JsomeK(I(P1))(De)
= 1 iff I(P1) ∩De 6= ∅
(37) *There is every curious student.
a. Logical skeleton: [there [is [every P1,<e,t> ]]
b. Interpretation: JeveryK(I(P1))(De)
= 1 iff I(P1) ⊆ De
Note that essentially the same story holds even if the deductive system
can see LFs+Rescale. We have already shown this in §2.1 for standard LFs,
so what we have to show now is just that modifying the open class terms by
Rescale does not change the acceptability patterns:
• In (36), even if the deductive system can see that P1 = Jcurious studentsK,
information about the evaluation world is required to determine whether
anything falls under it. Introducing Rescale(Jcurious studentsK) (e.g.,
to mean something like ‘there are some extremely curious students’)
doesn’t change that fact.15
15 Although here I briefly consider a case in which Rescale potentially downgrades an LF,
it is in general unnecessary to check this option. For suppose that adding Rescale to an
otherwise acceptable LF would result in unacceptability. The original LF without Rescale
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• In (37), even if we introduce Rescale(Jcurious studentsK) to its LF,
including recursive applications, the expression will still be tautologous,
since it will always hold that:
Rescale(Rescale(Jcurious studentsK)) ⊆
Rescale(Jcurious studentsK) ⊆ De
As with logical skeletons, then, only (37) comes out as L-trivial. The reason
why the target explanation holds with LFs+Rescale if it holds with logical
skeletons is obvious. Suppose sentence S comes out as L-trivial on the basis of
its logical skeleton. This means that the particular semantic values of its open
class terms do not make a difference to S’s truth value. A fortiori, it does not
make a difference whether its open class terms are (recursively) modified by
Rescale.
4.2 Connected exceptive phrases
Consider next the acceptability patterns on quantifiers imposed by connected
exceptives, illustrated by (12-a) and (12-b), repeated here as (38) and (39).
Some interpretations of P1 . . . P3 will make (38) true, and others will make
it false. However, all interpretations (which do not result in presupposition
failure, hence where I(P2) is not empty) will map (39) to false. Since some is
left upward entailing, we can always subtract less than I(P2), whatever that
is, namely, we can subtract nothing (let S = ∅).
(38) Every student but Mary smokes
a. Logical skeleton: [every [P1 but P2] P3]
b. Interpretation:JbutK(I(P1))(I(P2))JeveryK(I(P3)) = 1 iff I(P2) 6= ∅ andJeveryK(I(P1)− I(P2))(I(P3)) = 1 and
∀S[JeveryK(I(P1)− S)(I(P3)) = 1→ I(P2) ⊆ S]
(39) *Some student but Mary smokes.
a. Logical skeleton: [some [P1 but P2] P3]
b. Interpretation:JbutK(I(P1))(I(P2))JsomeK(I(P3)) = 1 iff I(P2) 6= ∅ andJsomeK(I(P1)− I(P2))(I(P3)) = 1 and
∀S[JsomeK(I(P1)− S)(I(P3)) = 1→ I(P2) ⊆ S]
would then be selected as the preferred disambiguation. In subsequent sections I discuss
only cases in which adding Rescale could potentially rescue an otherwise unacceptable LF.
20
Triviality and Logical Form
As in the case of there-existentials, what is important to note is that essen-
tially the same story holds if we assume instead LFs+Rescale. In §2.2, we
have already shown how we capture the acceptability patterns for standard LFs;
so what we now have to show is that introducing Rescale does not lead to in-
correctly rescuing (39). The only position where the modification could be prob-
lematic is Rescale(I(P2)), since this could potentially narrow the extension of
the complement of but. In other words, we know that Rescale(I(P2))⊆ I(P2);
however, to avoid presupposition failure, Rescale(I(P2)) 6= ∅. At this point,
its easy to see that, since some is left-upward entailing, we can still choose
S = ∅, hence (39) will (when defined) always be false.16 The following intuitive
examples illustrate the basic point. The problem with (40-a) is that we could
always substract less and keep truth, as in (40-b). But the same holds if we
try to rescue (40-a) by adding Rescale as in (41-a): although this can take
us to a subset of the complement of but, it still holds that we can substract
less, namely nothing, and keep truth, as in (41-b)
(40) a. *Some [students but the smart ones] smoke.
b. Some [students − ∅] smoke.
(41) a. *Some [students but the Rescale(smart) ones] smoke.
≈ *Some [students but the very smart ones] smoke.
b. Some [students − ∅] smoke
4.3 Negative islands in comparatives
Consider finally the restrictions on quantifiers in comparatives, illustrated by
(42) and (43). Their logical skeletons and corresponding interpretations are
given in (42-a)-(42-b) and (43-a)-(43-b) respectively.
(42) Mary is taller than every student is tall.
a. Logical skeleton:
[A is P1,<d,<e,t>>-er [than [every P2,<e,t>] is P3,<d,<e,t>>]]
b. Interpretation:
∃d [I(A) is d-I(P1) and every I(P2) is not d-I(P3)]
(43) *Mary is taller than no student is tall.
a. Logical skeleton:
[A is P1,<d,<e,t>>-er [than [no P2,<e,t>] is P3,<d,<e,t>>]]
16 Note that, if we let Rescale ‘widen’ interpretations (as some modulation-friendly theorists
would certainly insist we should), then, a fortiori, it cannot rescue (39). Indeed, none of the




∃d [I(A) is d-I(P1) and no I(P2) is not d-I(P3)]
Note that, by the definition of logical skeletons, the tokens of tall are treated
as if they could be different predicates (since gradable adjectives such as tall
are open class terms). Despite this, Gajewski argues that L-triviality can still
be proven for (43) if we place the following independently plausible constraints
on D<d,<e,t>>, the class of gradable predicates:
(44) a. Gradable adjectives are monotonic, as defined in (19) above.
b. The domains of gradable adjectives are restricted to scales, as
illustrated in (45) for tall and old.
(45) a. JtallK =
λd ∈ Sheight. λx : ∃d ∈ Sheight[height(x) = d]. d ≤ height(x)
b. JoldK =
λd ∈ Sage. λx : ∃d ∈ Sage[age(x) = d]. d ≤ age(x)
Given these assumptions, if I(P1) and I(P3) do not match, as in tall and old,
then both (42-b) and (43-b) come out as undefined. If I(P1) and I(P3) match,
then (42-b) is contingent. For as we saw in §2.3, for any gradable adjective
I(P1), there are some worlds in which I(A) is the I(P1)-est, compared to all
I(P2)s, and some in which I(A) is not the I(P1)-est. In contrast, (43-b) comes
out as trivially true when I(P1) and I(P3) match. To see this, recall the
basic argument from §2.3. We need to find a degree d such that I(A) (e.g.,
Mary) has d, and in addition each entity in the comparison class I(P2) has d.
Given monotonicity, we can choose a d between (0, dsmallest], where ‘dsmallest’
is the degree assigned to the smallest member of the union of I(A) and the
comparison class I(P2). Since there is always such a degree, (43) is, when
defined, always true, and is therefore marked as unacceptable.
Accounting for the difference between expressions such as (42) and (43)
given LF+Rescale instead of logical skeletons is quite simple. We have
already shown, in §2.3, that we can generate the basic pattern of restrictions on
negative generalized quantifiers in comparatives from standard logical forms.
So what we have to show now is that we cannot use Rescale to turn, say, (43),
repeated below as (46), into a contingent statement. This is easy to see. We
can use Rescale to restrict the interpretation of student, and get a contextual
reading like (46-a). We can also use it to restrict either or both tokens of tall,
and get a contextual reading like (46-b). Modulate any way you want, there
will always be a degree d between (0, ds], were ds is the height of the smallest
member of the union of Mary and the (restricted) set of students. In short,
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(46) is trivially true, even if we sprinkle Rescale wherever it’s allowed, and is
therefore marked as unnacceptable by the deductive system.
(46) *Mary is taller than no student is tall.
a. ∃d [Mary is d-tall and no smart student is not d-tall]
b. ∃d [Mary is roughly d-tall and no student is not roughly d-tall]
5 Logical skeletons vs LFs+Rescale
Where do we stand? We have seen that, as Gajewski (2002, 2009) and others
(e.g., Chierchia 2013, Fox & Hackl 2007) have argued, if we assume that
the deductive system operates on logical skeletons, we can generate just the
right class of L-trivial statements, i.e., the subset of the trivial sentences
which are unacceptable. Specifically, if the representations that feed into the
compositional semantics are logical skeletons, we cannot prove triviality for
acceptable tautologies and contradictions such as those in (23), yet can still
prove triviality for the unacceptable patterns involving quantifiers in there-
existentials, connected exceptives and negative islands in comparatives. We
have shown, however, that essentially the same results are obtained if we
assume LFs+Rescale. On this view, the logicality of language is paired with
a relatively standard conception of logical form, except that it is enriched with
the hypothesis that open class terms can be optionally modulated via a covert
Rescale operator, which I argued is independently needed (see §3.3). I now
try to show that, in key cases where their predictions differ, LF+Rescale
makes better predictions. §5.1 presents cases in which Skeletons systematically
overgenerates assignments of unacceptability, and in §5.2-§5.3 cases in which it
undergenerates assignments of unacceptability. Crucially, the cases explored in
§5.2-§5.3 constitute—together with there-existentials, connected exceptives, and
negative islands in comparatives—core accounts within the overall argument
for the logicality of language. Taken together, these results strongly suggest
that the logicality of language should be paired with a view of logical form
akin to LF+Rescale.
5.1 Contradictions with variable co-binding of predicates
We begin by examining cases involving co-binding of predicative variables
in which the two views of logical form make different predictions, and only
LF+Rescale generates the correct ones. Take a sentence such as (47), which
is superficially trivial but not L-trivial, and consider the variant in (48), which
involves co-binding of the tokens of tall, as represented by its logical form in
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(48-a). Gajewski (2009) admits that this variant, which can be systematically
generated for other acceptable trivial sentences, presents a problem for the
notion of L-triviality.17 Assume, as seems required, that these binding relations
are seen by the Grammar, hence must be encoded by logical skeletons. It
follows that L-triviality can be easily proven for (48-a), which is therefore (by
the logicality of language) predicted to be marked as unacceptable. However,
(48) is, even if odd, clearly not ungrammatical. In addition, this is precisely
what is predicted by LF+Rescale. For on this view, (48) can have the logical
form in (48-b), which is preferred over the contradictory and hence marked
logical form in (48-a).
(47) Bill is tall and Bill isn’t tall.
(48) Tall is what Bill is and isn’t.
a. Tall is [what1 Bill is t1 and is not t1]
b. Tall is [what1 Bill is t1 and is not Rescalec(t1)]
c. Tall is [what1 Bill is posc(t1) and is not posc′(t1)]
Gajewski (2009) concludes that cases such as (48) present an open problem
for the pairing of the logicality of language with logical skeletons. Still, it
might be tempting to respond on his behalf as follows. Assume that gradable
adjectives are degree functions of type < e, d >, which can occur with a covert
degree morpheme pos of type << e, d >,< e, t >> (Kennedy & McNally 2005,
Kennedy 2007). Pos determines the relevant standard, as a function of context,
for an object to fall under the adjective which is its argument. If we can leave
pos in situ when we move the adjective, one possible logical form for (48) would
be (48-c). Recall that various frameworks allow that contexts are updated as
information is processed, such that c 6= c′. It follows that since each token of
pos could determine a different standard, the deductive system cannot treat
(48-c) as a contradiction.
The problem with this response is that it doesn’t generalize to simple
variations of the original example. Specifically, we can construct examples with
explicitly scoped out overt degree morphemes, such as (49). Furthermore, the
proposed response cannot be applied to variations with non-gradable adjectives,
such as (50). In short, the simple variations in (49) and (50) are still incorrectly
predicted to be L-trivial, hence marked. In contrast, LF+Rescale again
makes the correct predictions: it generates for (49) the logical form in (49-a)
and for (50) the logical form in (50-b), neither of which is L-trivial.
(49) 2 meters tall is what Bill is and isn’t.
17 Gajewski (2009) attributes this observation to Danny Fox.
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a. 2m tall is [what1 Bill is t1 and isn’t Rescalec(t1)].
≈ Bill is around 2m tall but is not exactly 2m tall.
(50) Raining is what is and isn’t happening.
a. Raining is [what1 is t1 and is not t1 happening]
b. Raining is [what1 is t1 and is not Rescalec(t1) happening]
These examples might feel odd, especially when considered out of the blue.
Indeed, they might be in tension with other principles, such as principles of
manner or economy. The point here is just that they are clearly not marked as
ungrammatical, which is the prediction made by LFs+Rescale, but not by
Logical skeletons. One could of course hold that logical skeletons can include a
mechanism of nominal/verbal restriction, perhaps along the lines of Rescale.
If a solution along these lines is accepted, however, the need to distinguish
between acceptable trivialities such as those in (23), and the unacceptable
trivialities involving the distributions of quantifiers examined in §2, can no
longer be a reason to adopt Logical skeletons, as demonstrated in §4.
Importantly, cases of acceptable trivialities involving co-bound variables
present a systematic problem for Logical skeletons. In contrast, most of these
cases can be easily handled by LF+Rescale.18 To consider a different kind
of case, take (51), suggested by a reviewer. Note that (51) contains a trivial
embedded question. Suppose Mary and Peter are discussing John’s strange
recent behavior. Exasperated, Peter utters (51). Although the embedded
question is a superficial contradiction, (51) is not ungrammatical, and can be
easily rescued in this context. Assuming Hamblin (1973)’s account of questions,
the logical form and meaning of the embedded question in (51) would be
(51-a) and (51-b) respectively. Since the predicative variables in the embedded
question are co-bound by what, the logical skeleton cannot generate independent
variables. As a result, each proposition in the set of possible answers will be
seen as a contradiction, as shown in (51-b). In contrast, LF+Rescale also
generates the logical form in (51-c), which in this context can denote the set of
non-contradictory propositions in (51-d). This view correctly predicts that, in
this scenario, the discourse in (52), where Mary’s assertion entails that John is
a friend but not a good friend, is perfectly coherent.
(51) I wonder what John is and is not.
a. what1 John is t1 and John is not t1
b. {p: ∃Q[p = John is Q and John is not Q]}
18 I’m grateful to an anonymous reviewer for emphasizing this point, and for providing me with
a range of insightful examples and initial analyses. The rest of the discussion in this section
is greatly indebted to the reviewer’s constructive comments.
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c. what1 John is t1 and John is not Rescalec(t1)
d. ≈ {John is a cousin and not a good cousin, John is a friend and
not a good friend, John is a partner and not a good partner, . . . }
(52) a. Peter: I wonder what John is and is not.
b. Mary: A friend . . .
Another manifestation of the problem of co-bound variables for Skeletons
involves trivial sentences with reflexive pronouns (Gajewski 2009). Presenting
a full account of the target acceptability patterns is a difficult and controversial
task which I cannot embark here. Still, let us briefly consider two representative
examples which illustrate the prima facie advantage of LF+Rescale over
Skeletons in this domain.
The first example consists of comparatives, such as (53), in which the clausal
comparative contains a reflexive pronoun. Although acceptability intuitions
are in this case a bit fuzzy, it seems that (53) is strictly acceptable. To nudge
your intuitions, suppose (53) is uttered by Peter in a situation where John is
outshining his usual self, as in Look at John debate today! He is simply smarter
than himself !, used to say that John is smarter than he typically is. Assuming
the account of comparatives presented in §2.3, and a bound variable account
of reflexives, Skeletons incorrectly predicts that (53) is, when defined, trivially
false, hence strictly unacceptable. This can be seen from its logical skeleton in
(53-b), where to avoid presupposition failure P1 and P2 are required to take
a degree on the same scale (see §4.3). In contrast, LF+Rescale generates a
logical form for (53)—spelled out in (53-c)—which captures the target reading.
In this case, Rescale works as an adverbial modifier, and the sentence could
be resolved in context to say that there is a degree d such that John is at some
salient time/location d-smart, although he is not typically d-smart.
(53) John is smarter than himself.
a. John λ1 ∃d [t1 is d-smart and t1 is not d-smart]
b. John λ1 ∃d [t1 is d-P1,<d,<et>> and t1 is not d-P2,<d,<et>>]
c. John λ1 ∃d [t1 is Rescalec d-smart and t1 not is Rescalec′
d-smart]
The second example of acceptable trivialities with reflexives is illustrated by
the superficially simple sentence in (54). To nudge intuitions, consider again the
scenario in which Mary and Peter are dismayed by John’s recent uncharacteristic
behavior. Clearly, they can discuss John’s behavior using stylistic variants of
John is/is not himself, meaning that John is/is not behaving in characteristic
ways. LF+Rescale generates an appropriate logical form for this kind of
26
Triviality and Logical Form
acceptable target reading. To see this, let us assume, plausibly, that the target
reading involves predication and not directly identity. Accordingly, himself has
to be type-shifted to a predicate, which can be done via the ident operator
(Partee 1986b,a), as illustrated in (54-b). The output of this operation is
‘λx. x = t1’. This resolves the type mismatch but results, in this environment,
in a clear triviality, namely, ‘[λx. x = t1](t1)’—which is still trivial given its
logical skeleton. However, since ‘ident(himself1)’ is a predicate, it can be
modified by Rescale, as shown in (54-c). The output of this intersective
modification can be represented as ‘λx. x = t1 ∧ Pc(x)’; which is not trivial in
this environment—i.e., in ‘[λx. x = t1 ∧ Pc(x)](t1)’—and captures the target
reading. For example, suppose that, in c, P is assigned a property of John at
his best, e.g., generosity; we then get [λx. x = t1 ∧ generous(x)](t1).19
(54) John is himself.
a. John λ1 [t1 is himself1]
b. John λ1 [t1 is ident(himself1)]
c. John λ1 [t1 is Rescalec ident(himself1)]
5.2 Polarity items and contradiction
A key difference between Skeletons and LF+Rescale is that only for the latter
are classical formulas and inference rules, such as the Law of Non-contradiction
(LNC) and Modus Ponens (MP), valid at the level of representation where
acceptability/grammaticality is determined.20 Here we focus on the LNC. To
adopt Skeletons is to assume that the deductive system of language doesn’t ‘see’
the identity of open class terms, to the extent that different tokens of the same
term are treated as if independent. This entails that superficial contradictions
such as (31) above are not seen as such, as captured in (31-a). The underlying
generalization is simply that LNC doesn’t hold given logical skeletons, since this
formula is valid only if the dependency between non-logical terms is preserved,
19 This account also captures the target reading of John is not himself. Consider again the
scenario and assignments described above. Since ‘John = John’ is necessarily true, the
statement ‘not [John = John and John is generous]’ is resolved to the claim that John is
not generous, which corresponds to the intended reading. To be clear, I haven’t provided
an independent justification for this account of expressions like (54). Indeed, I am not sure
whether they really present a problem for Skeletons, although Gajewski (2009) seems to
think that they do. My aim here is just to show that LF+Rescale provides us with key
tools to explain why superficially trivial expressions with reflexives can be acceptable.
20 Relative to the familiar entries for the connectives and other relevant functional terms.
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as in (31-b).21 In contrast, according to LF+Rescale logical forms such as
(31-b) can be seen by the language system, but since they are trivially false
they are disfavored relative to potentially informative disambiguations where
Rescale modifies (at least) one of the tokens of raining. The question, then,
is this: Should the result that the LNC is valid if we adopt LF+Rescale but
not if we adopt Skeletons be taken as support for the former view? There is no
simple move to that conclusion. For the issue here concerns the properties of
a natural deductive system, which could be radically different from classical
systems. Furthermore, even if we adopt Skeletons, there is still a level of
representation where the dependency between tokens of open class terms is
recovered. Accordingly, one could hold that it is at this post-compositional
level that classical formulas/rules of inference, including the LNC, apply (cf.
Chierchia 2013).22
Still, this relative neutrality (with respect to the classicality of the natural
deductive system) is available to proponents of the logicality of language only
if the corresponding accounts of acceptability based on logical triviality do
not depend on the validity of any of the formulas/rules of inference which are
allegedly suspended at the level of representation where grammaticality is de-
termined. Can this be maintained relative to the LNC? Admittedly, in the case
of there-existentials, connected exceptives, and negative islands in comparatives
we proved triviality—i.e., truth or falsity under all models—without assuming
the LNC, and still captured the target acceptability patterns.23 However, this
is not the case for other key accounts based on the logicality of language,
including Chierchia’s (2006, 2013) influential account of the distribution of
polarity sensitive items. Specifically, I will now argue that this account requires
that the LNC be valid at the level of representation where the deductive system
21 Gajewski is aware of this consequence of Skeletons. He notes that the basic idea has a precursor
in Ko¨rner’s (three-valued) logic of inexact concepts (1955, 1960), which provides truth tables
that, as shown by Williamson (1994), effectively treat each token of a propositional variable
as independent.
22 From this perspective, it is only at this level that we can engage in, e.g., pragmatic reasoning
from Gricean maxims, since this presumably depends on respecting the LNC and MP. To be
sure, one could also hold that pragmatic reasoning is determined or constrained by a kind
of natural logic; but this system should then be strictly distinguished from the automatic
deductive system of the language module. For related discussions, see Szabo´ (2012) and
Iacona (2017).
23 To be fair, since those are the main acceptability patterns examined by Gajewski (2002,
2009), he could consistently adopt a deductive system which treats all non-logical terms as
independent.
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determines grammaticality, as entailed by LF+Rescale but not—at least
without additional ad hoc stipulations—by Skeletons.24
Consider the distribution of the NPI any, illustrated in (55)-(56). According
to Chierchia (2013), any is an indefinite with existential force which, unlike
its plain counterpart a/an, obligatorily activates alternatives. This, in turn,
triggers a process of automatic exhaustification which is the key component to
explain the difference in the distribution of any and its plain counterparts.
(55) a. John doesn’t have an egg.
b. John doesn’t have any eggs.
(56) a. John has an egg.
b. *John has any eggs.
The mode of exhaustification and set of alternatives relevant to assertions
with any is defined in (57). This definition will become clear once we apply
it to some examples below. For now, note that (i) the second conjunct of
(57-a) guarantees the negation of alternatives which are logically stronger than
the prejacent, and (ii) the set of alternatives, as defined in (57-b), is just the
domain restricted versions of the prejacent.
(57) a. JODA φKg,w = JφKg,w ∧ ∀p ∈ JφKDA[p→ λw′JφKg,w′ ⊆ p]
b. JφKDA = {JφK : D′ ⊆ g(D)}
To explain the distribution of any, two observations are crucial. The first is that,
in downward entailing environments, the obligatory exhaustification triggered
by any is empty and thus unproblematic. Consider (58). The prejacent—
namely, that John doesn’t have an egg—entails all the alternatives. To see
this, suppose the relevant domain D (for brevity, we use ‘D’ below instead of
‘g(D)’) concerns the eggs in John’s house. That John doesn’t have an egg in
his house entails that John doesn’t have an egg in any of its rooms. Recall that
the second conjunct in (57-a) guarantees that alternatives which are entailed
by the prejacent are not negated. So exhaustification is in this case vacuous
and simply returns the prejacent.
(58) John doesn’t have any eggs.
a. ODA(¬[∃x ∈ D[eggw(x) ∧ havew(j, x)]])
24 Abrusa´n (2014: ch. 6) raises a similar point to argue that Logical skeletons, as the view is
standardly conceived, must be substantially revised to allow for accounts of acceptability
patterns which appeal to contradictions. This includes not only Chierchia’s account of the
distribution of polarity-sensitive items, but also various logicality based accounts—including
Abrusa´n’s own—of presuppositional, negative and other weak island effects. See §5.3 below.
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b. DA = {¬[∃x ∈ D′[eggw(x) ∧ havew(j, x)]] : D′ ⊆ D}
The second observation is that, in upward entailing environments, the obligatory
exhaustification triggered by any generates contradictions. The key difference is
that, in this case, the prejacent—namely, that John has an egg—doesn’t entail
any of the alternatives. Suppose John’s house has a living room and a kitchen.
That John has an egg doesn’t entail that John has an egg in the living room,
and it doesn’t entail that John has an egg in the kitchen. Exhaustification will
therefore negate these stronger alternatives and generate the proposition in
(59-c), which is a contradiction.
(59) *John has any eggs.
a. ODA(∃x ∈ D[eggw(x) ∧ havew(j, x)]])
b. DA = {∃x ∈ D′[eggw(x) ∧ havew(j, x)] : D′ ⊆ D}
c. ∃x ∈ D[eggw(x) ∧ havew(j, x)]
∧ ∀D′ ⊆ D[¬∃x ∈ D′[eggw(x) ∧ havew(j, x)]]
≈ John has an egg ∈ Dhouse ∧¬John has an egg ∈ Dkitchen
∧¬ John has an egg ∈ Dliving room
As in the cases in §2, the presence of trivial truth-conditions explains, given the
logicality of language, why any is unacceptable in upward entailing environ-
ments. The key point, however, is that unlike for there-existentials, connected
exceptives, and comparatives, in this case the triviality can be traced to a
violation of the LNC. The problem is that this formula is not valid given logical
skeletons: for its validity requires that the system respect the dependency
between—i.e., the uniform substitutions of semantic values for—tokens of the
same open class terms, as in (59-c). If we generate a logical skeleton for (59-c),
shown in (60), we can immediately see that the result is not L-trivial:
(60) John has a P1 ∈ Dhouse ∧¬John has a P2 ∈ Dkitchen
∧¬ John has a P3 ∈ Dliving room
In contrast to Skeletons, LF+Rescale doesn’t affect the account of NPIs
such as any. The reason is simple. First, on this view violations of LNC can
be identified. Second, application of Rescale doesn’t affect the monotonicity
of the relevant environments, hence it doesn’t change the basic outcomes of
each case of obligatory exhaustification. To illustrate, consider (61), which is
like (59) except that we introduced Rescale to (try to) rescue it. Applied
to this logical form, ODA as defined in (57) has two key implications. First,
ODA is sensitive only to domain (and not syntactically simpler) alternatives, as
captured in the formulation in (57-b). Since in (61) Rescale is a constituent
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of the logical form of the prejacent, it must be present in all the domain
alternatives DA. Second, an assignment function determines the value of the
context parameter of Rescale in (61). Since alternatives don’t have a context
of their own, but instead inherit their context from the utterance context of
the source, it follows from (57) that this assignment must be uniform—i.e., the
same parameter value assigned to the token of Rescale in the prejacent is
assigned to each token in each alternative. Again, the only variation allowed for
each item in DA is in the domain of the existential quantifier.25 This generates
the contradiction in (61-c):
(61) *John has any Rescalec(eggs).
a. ODA(∃x ∈ D[Rescalec(eggw)(x) ∧ havew(j, x)]])
b. DA = {∃x ∈ D′[Rescalec(eggw)(x) ∧ havew(j, x)] : D′ ⊆ D}
c. ∃x ∈ D[Rescalec(eggw)(x) ∧ havew(j, x)]
∧ ∀D′ ⊆ D[¬∃x ∈ D′[Rescalec(eggw)(x) ∧ havew(j, x)]]
In short, LF+Rescale doesn’t affect Chierchia’s basic account of the dis-
tribution of any. In particular, we need not make any additional or ad hoc
stipulations to preserve the basic explanation of why, in upward entailing
environments, any generates contradictions and is thus unacceptable.
In light of this, consider the following response on behalf of Skeletons.
Instead of taking blindness to open class terms as a kind of general property
of the language system at the relevant level, think of the algorithm for logical
skeletons, specified in (24) above, as a kind of rule. This rule can be applied to
generate a logical skeleton for (59) either before or after we get the relevant
alternatives. The previous objection holds only if we apply the rule after we
generate the relevant alternatives. If, however, we apply the rule before we
generate alternatives, we would get the alternatives to ‘copy’ the skeleton, as
in (62-b), and thus get a contradiction, specified in (62-c).
25 The requirement that there be a uniform assignment for the open parameter for each token
of Rescale in the prejacent and its alternatives is independently motivated. This is how, in
general, we must treat the context sensitive parameters of (non-focused) characters in the
prejacent and their corresponding alternatives. For example, an assertion of someF of the
walls in [that house]1 are red in response to the question do you know any house which is
totally red?, would invoke the alternative all of the walls in [that house]1 are red, where the
index/value of that house is fixed across alternatives. For another kind of example, consider
assignments of comparison classes. Suppose John wants to buy a soccer team with only
tall players. Knowing this, Peter tells John that someF Man U players are tall ; a relevant
alternative in this case is all Man U players are tall, where the same comparison class is
used in the assertion and its alternatives (e.g., ‘tall for a soccer player’).
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(62) *John has any eggs.
a. ODA(∃x ∈ D[Pw(x) ∧ havew(J, x)]])
b. DA = {∃x ∈ D′[Pw(x) ∧ havew(J, x)] : D′ ⊆ D}
c. ∃x ∈ D[Pw(x) ∧ havew(J, x)]
∧ ∀D′ ⊆ D[¬∃x ∈ D′[Pw(x) ∧ havew(J, x)]]
≈ J has a P ∈ Dhouse ∧¬J has a P ∈ Dkitchen
∧¬ J has a P ∈ Dliving room
This response is technically available to proponents of Skeletons, but it comes
with a price. Once it is adopted, logical skeletons can no longer be understood
as resulting from a general property of the language system at the level where
grammaticality is determined (cf. Chierchia 2013, Fox & Hackl 2007). The
theoretical assumptions which underlie the view that the language system
doesn’t ‘see’ or ‘care’ about open class terms would have to be revised. In its
place, proponents would have to hold that the deductive system of language
can sometimes see and sometimes not whether different tokens are of the same
open class term. In contrast, LF+Rescale, which preserves the validity of
LNC, can accommodate the basic account of NPIs without making any ad
hoc/additional stipulations. Most importantly, note that the problem posed to
Skeletons by the logicality-based account of polarity distribution, when taken
together with that posed by acceptable contradictions with co-binding (see
§5.1), suggests that any potential reformulation of Skeletons will be rather ad
hoc. For, on one hand, to account for the unacceptability of NPIs in upward
entailing environments, we would need to stipulate that the deductive system
can see contradictions when induced by conjoining the prejacent and its negated
domain alternatives. This is possible only if logical skeletons do encode when
tokens are copies of particular open class terms. On the other hand, to allow for
the acceptability of (superficial) contradictions involving co-bound predicates,
we would need to say that tokens of open class variables, formally co-bound by
an open class term, are somehow not encoded as such by logical skeletons.
5.3 Weak presuppositional islands in manner questions
The last case in support of LF+Rescale that we’ll discuss centers around
Abrusa´n’s (2011a, 2014) logicality-based account of weak presuppositional
islands in manner questions. Abrusa´n’s account of this and other weak island
constraints together constitute a key piece of evidence for the logicality of
language. Hence supporters of this hypothesis should adopt a notion of logical
form that is compatible with Abrusa´n’s account, even if there is disagreement
on the details. In addition, this discussion will allow us to explore some central
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issues, relevant to various accounts in this tradition, concerning the logicality
of language and the formal status of attitude verbs. In recent work (2014:
ch. 4), Abrusa´n has already argued that her logicality-based account of weak
islands is not compatible with Skeletons. In this section, I develop a reasonable
response on behalf of Skeletons, and then present some novel considerations
for Abrusa´n’s conclusion. Finally, I show that LF+Rescale coheres perfectly
with Abrusa´n’s account of weak presuppositional islands.
The target generalization is that wh-words that range over manners can
escape weak islands when embedded under a non-factive attitude verb (e.g.,
hope, desire), but not when embedded under a factive one (e.g., regret, know).
This basic pattern is illustrated in (63), and can be contrasted with the pattern
displayed by the identity questions in (64):
(63) a. *How does John regret that Peter fixed the car?
b. How does John hope that Peter fixed the car?
(64) a. Who does John hope fixed the car?
b. Who does John regret fixed the car?
Abrusa´n (2011a, 2014) argues that the best explanation for this pattern is that,
in these manner questions, factive verbs generate contradictory presuppositions.
This logicality-style account is based on two premises. The first is that, in this
environment, the presence of a variable in the scope of a factive verb results in
a universal presupposition. This is illustrated in (65):
(65) Who among these ten people does Mary regret that Bill invited?
a. λp.∃x[x ∈ {these ten people} ∧ p = λw′: Mary believesw′ that
Bill invited x. Mary regretsw′ that Bill invited x]
b. Presupposition: ∀x ∈ {these ten people} : Mary believes that
Bill invited x
In light of this, consider again the unacceptable example (63-a), repeated in
(66), of a weak island violation. At first glance, the universal presupposition
of the question, captured in (66-b), seems innocent: it just says that Mary
believes that Peter fixed the car in each of a given set of ways.
(66) *How does John regret that Peter fixed the car?
a. λp.∃α[α ∈ DM ∧ p = λw′ : John believesw′ that Peter fixed the
car in way α. John regretsw′ that Peter fixed the car in way α]
b. Presupposition: ∀α ∈ DM : John believes that Peter fixed the
car (i.e., Peter’s car fixing event e) in way α
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The second premise of Abrusa´n’s account, however, is that domains of manners
always contain contraries. Contrary manners—e.g., carefully vs. carelessly,
slowly vs. quickly—cannot both be true of the same event, although they can
both be false. On this view, any contextual assignment of a set of relevant
manners, g(DM), has the following property: for every manner predicate
P ∈ g(DM) there is another P ′ ∈ g(DM) such that P ∩ P ′ = ∅. Given these
two premises, we can now identify the problem with (66-b): if, say, {careful,
erratic}∈ g(DM) the presupposition of (66) is that John has the incoherent
belief that Peter’s car fixing event e was careful and erratic.26
The question that concerns us here is whether Abrusa´n’s logicality-style
account can be maintained in Skeletons and in LF+Rescale. According to
Abrusa´n (2014), the target difference between (63-a) and (63-b) cannot be
computed from their corresponding logical skeletons. To see why, consider
their (partial) logical skeletons in (67-a) and (67-b). Since attitude verbs like
regret and hope are (on most accounts) open class terms of the same semantic
type, Skeletons entails that they should be replaced with different variables of
the same type. As a result, a deductive system operating on these skeletons
is blind to the original difference in their presuppositions. Since factivity is
not a property of all verbal predicates that take propositional complements,
we cannot stipulate it as a general constrain on D<<s,t>,<e,<s,t>>>. In short,
a deductive system operating on logical skeletons cannot distinguish between
(67-a) and (67-b), and thus fails to predict the contrast in their acceptability.
(67) a. *How does John regret that Peter fixed the car?
{John V1,<<s,t>,<e,<s,t>>> that Peter VP3 in way α : α ∈ DM}
b. How does John hope that Peter fixed the car?
{John V2,<<s,t>,<e,<s,t>>> that Peter VP3 in way α : α ∈ DM}
In contrast, Abrusa´n’s account can be maintained in LF+Rescale without
making any ad hoc stipulations. We have seen that the difference between
unacceptable cases with factives like (67-a) and acceptable cases with non-
factives like (67-b) can be proven given standard logical forms, so we only
26 Note that the source of unacceptability, in the example with regret, is the attribution of
a contradictory/incoherent belief. This is quite different from generating a contradiction.
The latter cannot be entailed by any context, but presumably there are contexts that
entail/admit that some agent has contradictory beliefs. Parallel manner questions with
knows presumably generate a stronger presupposition. Still this account might ultimately
need an additional stipulation such that contradictions/tautologies are banned in every
environment, including as complements of attitude verbs (this is compatible with allowing
logical forms with acceptable superficial trivialities that, after contextual saturation, can be
resolved to contradictions/tautologies, as I argued in §3.3).
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need to show that Rescale cannot rescue the cases with factives. Two
observations are crucial. First, attitude verbs like regret can be modified, as in
John superficially regrets what he did, but he doesn’t truly regret it. Secondly,
intersective modifiers do not in general change the presuppositions of their
arguments or sisters: e.g., John partially regrets that φ and John regrets that
φ have the same presupposition (on this account, that John believes that φ).
The simplest assumption about Rescale, in this domain, is that it behaves
like its overt counterparts. Accordingly, for any context c, John Rescalec
knows that φ entails φ, and John Rescalec hopes that φ does not entail φ. It
follows that Rescale cannot rescue the unacceptable manner questions:
(68) a. *How does John Rescalec regret that Peter fixed the car?
b. *How does John really regret that Peter fixed the car?
(69) a. How does John Rescalec hope that Peter fixed the car?
b. How does John really hope that Peter fixed the car?
Now, we can also try to rescue (66)/(67-a) by adding Rescale as an adjunct to
the trace of how. The effect of this modification would be a relevance restriction
on the set DM . However, Abrusa´n’s account is based on the stipulation that
any domain DM of manners, independently of how it is contextually restricted,
comes with pairs of contraries. A fortiori, any restriction by Rescale would
output a subdomain of manners that still includes pairs of contraries.
There is, however, a way of revising Skeletons which can be used to capture
the target acceptability patterns for manner questions (cf. Fox & Hackl 2007,
Mayr 2017). The basic idea is this. Attitude verbs have a quantificational
component, and in this respect are like some logical terms. We can thus
decompose each of these items into a logical and a non-logical component.
Each items factivity, or lack thereof, can be encoded in its logical component.
This is illustrated in the (simplified) lexical entries (70) and (71)—note that
what is erased in the corresponding skeletons for know, in (70-b), and hope, in
(71-b), is just the specific accessibility relation. With this revision, the contrast
between the unacceptable manner question in (67-a) and the acceptable one in
(67-b) can be computed from their logical skeletons.
(70) a. JknowK = λp.λx.λw : p(w) = 1. ∀w′[w′ ∈ Doxx,w → p(w′) = 1]
b. Skeleton: λp.λx.λw : p(w) = 1. ∀w′[w′ ∈ Rx,w → p(w′) = 1]
(71) a. JhopeK = λp.λx.λw. ∀w′[w′ ∈ Hopx,w → p(w′) = 1]
b. Skeleton: λp.λx.λw. ∀w′[w′ ∈ Qx,w → p(w′) = 1]
This revision of Skeletons, however, gives rise to a version of the glitch
(see §3) for attitude verbs, the solution of which arguably requires that we
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independently appeal to Rescale. Consider the examples in (72) and (73),
all of which are strictly acceptable. Assuming that the factivity of knows
is encoded in logical skeletons, the examples in (73) each seem to entail a
contradiction which can be seen by the deductive system. Now, we can still
account for the acceptability of (73-a) by noting that the complement of each
token of knows is assigned a different logical skeleton. However, this solution
is not available for (73-b), for reasons familiar from the discussion of variable
co-binding in §5.1. Specifically, (72-b) and (73-b) involve the co-binding of
propositional variables. Assuming factivity can be read from logical skeletons,
(73-b) entails a contradiction, and is thus incorrectly predicted to be marked
as unacceptable.
(72) a. John believes that God exists and he also believes that God does
not exist.
b. That God exists is what John believes is the case and also believes
is not the case.
(73) a. John knows that God exists and he also knows that God does not
exist.
b. That God exists is what John knows is the case and also knows is
not the case.
In contrast, LF+Rescale correctly predicts the acceptability of these
examples. At first, one might be tempted to explain this by appealing to logical
forms in which the attitude verbs are modified, as in (74-a)-(74-b). However,
since modification with Rescale cannot affect the presuppositions of the
corresponding attitude verb, these logical forms still predict a contrast, such
that only (74-b) entails a contradiction and is thus marked as unacceptable.
(74) a. That God exists is what John Rescalec believes is the case and
also Rescalec′ believes is not the case.
b. *That God exists is what John Rescalec knows is the case and
also Rescalec′ knows is not the case.
Recall from the discussion of superficial contradictions in §3.2 that LF+Rescale
generates a logical form for sentences like God exists as God [Rescalec ex-
ists ]. So LF+Rescale generates a logical form with covert Rescale for the
topicalized clause, as in (75-a) and (76-a). In this case, (76-a) no longer entails
a contradiction, and is correctly predicted to be strictly acceptable, just like
(75-a).27 This logical form accounts for the default reading in contexts such as
27 Note that the value of the contextually sensitive parameter of Rescale can be different at
each cite. This assumption, which also holds of other overt characters in similar constructions,
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this: ‘That God exists is what John knows is and is not the case. He knows
God exists in each of us, but also knows that God isn’t anything beyond that.’
(75) a. That God Rescalec exists is what John believes is the case and
also believes is not the case.
b. John believes [God Rescalec′ exists] and believes not [God
Rescalec′′ exists]
(76) a. That God Rescalec exists is what John knows is the case and
also knows is not the case.
b. John knows [God Rescalec′ exists] and knows not [God Rescalec′′
exists]
I should add that, even if some of the details of Abrusa´n’s account of weak
presuppositional islands in manner questions are rejected, our main results still
bear on various logicality-based accounts in which the non/factivity of attitude
verbs plays a key explanatory role by generating trivialities. This includes
Abrusa´n’s (2011b) account of wh-islands and Mayr’s (2017) recent account
of interrogative embeddings. Although I can’t defend that claim here, I hope
this discussion suggests that these sorts of accounts are best pursued within a
version of the logicality of language that is paired with LF+Rescale rather
than with Skeletons.
6 Conclusion
The logicality of language is one of the most important hypotheses about
the computational architecture of language to come out of recent work in
formal semantics. It issues in elegant accounts of general acceptability patterns
involving the distribution of not only quantificational determiners (§2), but
also scalar implicatures, polarity sensitive items (§5.2), adverbs, verbs, and
attitude verbs in presuppositional (§5.3) and negative islands (Dowty 1979,
Fox 2000, Fox & Hackl 2007, Gajewski 2008b,a, Chierchia 2006, 2013, Abrusa´n
2011a,b, 2014, Mayr 2017). This paper explored which notion of logical form
should be paired with the logicality of language. Minimally, any plausible
candidate should have the result that, when combined with the assumption
that the deductive system automatically filters out trivial expressions, it does
is independently motivated. For example, in the default interpretation of (i), the comparison
class of tall can vary at each position.
(i) Distinctively tall is [what1 Mary was t1 in kindergarten and also t1 in college].
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not also incorrectly predict that acceptable trivial sentences, such as those in
(23), are marked as unacceptable.
The dominant response, we have seen, is to wed the logicality of language
to the view that, at the level of representation where grammaticality is de-
termined, logical forms are logical skeletons. The implications of this move
should not be underestimated. It entails that compositional operations are
blind to the content, and even the character, of all open class words. This
results in a particular division between semantics and pragmatics which opens
a considerable gap between the outputs of the compositional semantics and
intuitions about what is said. Not only are truth-conditions the product of
post-compositional pragmatic processes, but even the characters of complex
expressions are not fully determined by linguistic compositional processes. The
resulting view, in which semantics plays a minimal role within the language
system, is reminiscent of positions advocated by Chomsky (2005, 2013). Adopt-
ing logical skeletons also has substantial implications for our conception of the
automatic deductive system. The end-result of seeing every token of an open
class term, hence every sentential clause, as if it was independent is that the
deductive system cannot see/follow classically valid formulas and rules such
as LNC and MP, or indeed almost any inference rules at all (see Williamson
1994: ch.4 on Ko¨rner’s 1955, 1960 three-valued logic).
The main contention of this paper is that distinguishing between L-trivial
and acceptable trivial sentences within the basic framework of the logicality of
language doesn’t require endorsing Skeletons. There is at least one more live
option, LF+Rescale, which is based on more standard assumptions about the
information encoded in logical forms. In particular, on this view language can
see when different tokens are of the same open class terms, and as a consequence
can be paired with a deductive system which follows classical rules such as MP.
Indeed, if we are correct about the comparative advantages of this view, then
its ability to adequately distinguish between L-trivial and acceptable trivial
sentences is a good reason for including something like Rescale—i.e., some
optional item for modulation of open class terms—in our accounts of logical
form. This constitutes a significant piece of evidence, so far overlooked, in favor
of families of ‘contextualist’ frameworks which allow, albeit in different ways,
some fine tuning of nouns and other open class terms within the compositional
semantics (e.g., Pagin & Pelletier 2007, Recanati 2010, Stanley 2000, Szabo´ &
Stanley 2000, Sauerland 2014, Mart´ı 2006, Lasersohn 2012, Dekker 2014).
At the same time, the argument presented here issues in a substantial
constraint on all modulation-friendly frameworks that accept the logicality
of language. In our implementation, Rescale does not apply to any logical
or functional terms. Otherwise, we would risk—and in some cases certainly
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lose—the accounts of why some L-trivial sentences are marked as unacceptable
and cannot be rescued. For if we could modify the meaning of logical terms,
some L-trivial sentences would arguably be rescued. For example, consider
the entry for JbutK in (14-b) above, and suppose that, in some cases, we could
modulate its meaning by dropping the conjunct which specifies the ‘least you
have to take out’ condition. Given this flexibility, we should be able to rescue
some students but Mary passed the exam, and incorrectly predict that it has
an acceptable (and potentially quite informative) reading along the lines of
‘some students passed the exam, and Mary need not be in that group’. In
short, if logical/functional terms could be modulated, some L-trivial expressions
should be odd but not strictly unacceptable. Since this is not the case, we
conclude that functional terms are not modulated by the language system.
Some views which allow semantic modulation respect this constraint (e.g.,
Stanley 2000, Szabo´ & Stanley 2000, Mart´ı 2006), but others are formulated
in a way which allows, in principle at least, modulation of all terms (e.g.
Recanati 2010, Lasersohn 2012), and hence should be constrained along the
lines suggested here.
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